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STRAIGHT AND TWISTED 
SELF-DECEPTION
abstract
The paper analyzes the two types of self-deception, usually labeled straight and twisted self-deception. 
In straight cases the self-deceptive belief coincides with the subject’s desire. In twisted cases, by 
contrast, the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject’s desire as in the example of Othello’s conviction of 
Desdemona’s infidelity. Are both these contrasting types of deceptive beliefs cases of SD? The argument 
of this paper shall answer this question in the positive, yet in different way from the unitary explanation 
of straight and twisted SD proposed by Alfred Mele. The causal account of SD claims to provide a unitary 
and simple explanation for both straight and twisted SD, and considers such a unitary explanation 
as a specific virtue of the causal view. Within the same causal model, the difference between straight 
and twisted self-deception is explained by a difference in the motivational state that in twisted cases 
is dominated by emotions. The paper will critically examine this claim, and advance an alternative 
explanation based on a different view of self-deception where emotions play a role alongside wishes both 
in straight and in twisted case.
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In this paper, I intend to face the issue of two types of self-deception (SD) usually labeled 
straight and twisted self-deception. I take that SD is believing that P against the available 
evidence and on the basis of one’s wish that P. In straight cases, the self-deceptive belief 
coincides with the subject’s desire. For example Swann, the hero of the first book of Proust’s 
La Recherche, desperately wishes that his lover Odette is faithful to him; hence he discounts 
all the evidence suggesting Odette’s infidelity so as to go on believing her faithful1. In twisted 
cases, by contrast, the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject’s desire as in the example of 
Othello who, despite wanting Desdemona faithful to him, becomes convinced of Desdemona’s 
infidelity in the absence of the appropriate evidence. Can we consider both these contrasting 
types of deceptive beliefs as cases of SD? 
In the philosophical discussion, SD is accounted for by two opposite models: the intentional, 
according to which SD is a doing of the subject, though non-transparently, and the causal, 
according to which SD is a mental event caused by a motivational state triggering cognitive 
biases. Twisted SD represents one of the several weaknesses of the intentional model, as noted 
by the eminent representative of the causal account, Alfred Mele (2001). Intentionalists view 
SD as a non-transparent plan of the subject, vicariously serving her goal to believe what she 
wishes to be the case (Davidson 1985, Talbott 1995, Bermudez 2000). In twisted cases, however, 
the subject ends up believing what she does not wish, hence the purposive nature of her 
deceptive belief is undermined. Why should anyone engage in such a self-sabotaging plan, 
though unconsciously? Within the intentional account, twisted SD is a problem, requiring a 
different kind of account.
By contrast, the deflationary causal-motivationalist account of SD claims to provide a unitary 
and simple explanation for both straight and twisted SD, and considers such a unitary 
explanation as a specific virtue of the causal view (Lazar 1997, 1998; Mele 2001, Scott-Kakures 
2002).
I will critically examine this claim, and argue that the unitary model provided by the causal 
account pays the price of its deflationary approach and is much less unitary than is claimed. 
I shall propose an alternative explanation, which makes sense of the difference between 
straight and twisted cases; my alternative explanation is based on what I have labeled the 
1  Both Swann and Othello have more complicated attitudes, feelings and beliefs, but here I consider them only in 
sketchy manner as types of straight and twisted SD
1. Introductory 
remarks
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‘Invisible Hand model of SD’ (Galeotti 2012) and is carried out by means of a more detailed 
analysis of the composition of the motivational state.
My argument proceeds as follows: I shall start by presenting the deflationary account as 
provided by Alfred Mele (2001), and pointing out its weaknesses. Then, I shall briefly outline 
my alternative account of SD, patterned after the invisible hand model, and turn to the unitary 
explanation of straight and twisted cases. I shall focus my critical analysis on unpacking the 
black box of the “motivational state.” In this way, I shall be able to understand the similar 
mechanism in both straight and twisted cases as well as to explain their difference. The 
difference between the two SD types lies in the different emotional response to the threat of P 
not being true, each leading to a specific cognitive option and to related biases.
Mele lists the following as jointly sufficient conditions for SD:
1) the belief that p which S acquires is false;
2) S treats data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth value of p in a 
motivationally biased way;
3) This biased treatment is a non-deviant cause of S’s acquiring the belief that p, 
4) The body of data possessed by S at the time provides greater warrant for non-p than for p.
I hold that these four conditions are actually insufficient a) to characterize SD as a specific 
phenomenon in the range of motivated irrationality; b) to explain the selective working of 
SD, which is not the general cognitive shortcut taken all the time we meet with unwelcome 
evidence; c) to provide a satisfactory unitary model for both straight and twisted cases. My 
argument will concentrate on the third issue, but will advance some remarks also on the 
others.
The four sufficient conditions state that a belief is self-deceptive if 1) it is false; 2) it is causally 
produced by cognitive biases; 3) triggered by a (yet undefined) motivational state; 4) when the 
subject possesses evidence contrary to the belief in question. Condition (4) does not specify 
if the data “possessed by S” are merely available to her, in front of her eyes, or are actually 
appraised by S. Moreover, the order of the four conditions is such that the intrinsic link with 
condition (2), concerning the biased treatment of data, is obscured. Actually SD is initiated 
because S has appraised data contrary to, hence undermining, the truth of S’s wish that P. S’s 
emotional response to this threat leads her to linger on her thoughts which become easily 
affected by biases, ending up in the belief that P, which is false but corresponds to S’s anxious 
wish. 
The two points of a) the appraisal of contrary evidence and b) the consequent priming of 
the biased treatment of data, and in that order, are to my mind crucial to account for SD as 
a specific instance of motivated irrationality. If the subject believes what she wishes, and if 
it contingently turns out that what she wishes happens to run against available data, then 
SD is just a case of wishful thinking gone badly. If instead SD is the motivationally distorted 
response to the threat of the negative evidence that the subject perceives or suspects as 
running against her wish that P, then it is a distinct phenomenon in the range of motivated 
irrationality. In the first case, SD is not sufficiently marked off doxastic states such as wishful-
thinking and illusions. The distinctiveness of SD is simply entrusted to condition (1), that P is 
false, which however is just definitional, and does not affect (2), that is the production of the 
self-deceptive belief. In order to preserve the specificity of SD I hold firstly that condition (4) 
must be revised as “S appraises of data contrary to her wish that P, making her suspect that P 
is under threat”; and secondly the ordering position of the four conditions must be changed to 
make clear that the biased treatment of data is primed by the threatening suspicion aroused 
by the appraisal of negative data. Moreover, the distinctiveness of SD further requires that 
the condition “S has a wish that P” be added to the list. A distinctive feature of self-deceptive 
2. The deflationary 
account critically 
examined
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beliefs compared to other motivated false beliefs, such as stubborn ones, is that the content of 
self-deceptive belief is thematically linked to the motivating wish (Lynch 2013).
If the SD process starts as the reconsideration of the negative evidence concerning the wish 
that P by a subject under a motivational state, then the process cannot simply be described 
as the causal triggering of motivation on biases which in turn causally affect the subject’s 
reasoning. I agree that the product of SD is unintended, but I hold that the mental process 
producing SD is intentionally entered into as a response to the suspicion of ~P. Thinking 
matters over, when a threat to one’s own crucial wish that P, is not epistemically faulty; but 
the emotionally loaded wish that P is likely to unleash cognitive biases in considering the 
available evidence, bringing about the self-deceptive belief. Briefly, I propose an explanation 
of SD patterned after the ‘invisible hand model’ to explain SD. The model, advanced for the 
explanation of seemingly purposeful social phenomena (Nozick 1977), provides a neat account 
of the coexistence of intentional doing, causal composition, and unintentional outcome, for it 
explains a certain beneficial effect as “the result of human action, but not of human design” 
(Hayek 1952). Similarly, in SD the intentionality of process must be sharply distinguished from 
the non-intentionality of outcome, despite the apparently self-serving result. The invisible 
hand model can also make sense of the apparent purposefulness of the SD product, which, 
though it is not a goal of the self-deceiver, however is not simply contingent. Arriving at the 
false belief that P is the effect of the subject’s biasing, but stopping at P is her intentional 
doing. As I shall show late, also twisted cases, in a way, serve a goal of the subject though 
definitely not brought about with that intention. 
Turning now to straight and twisted case, the analysis of motivation, as suggested by the 
causal model, raises the following controversial issues:
1) Does the content of the motivational state change in the case of twisted SD compared to 
straight SD? If it does, is the explanation of both straight and twisted cases still unified? 
(Mele 2001, Lazar 1999, Scott-Kakures 2002).
2) Is the operative desire for producing either straight or twisted SD the desire that P be the 
case or the desire to believe that P? (Nelkin 2002)
3) Should there be a match between the operative desire and the content of self-deceptive 
belief or is the operative desire content-unrestricted compared to the self-deceptive belief? 
(Nelkin 2002, 2012).
 Concerning point (3), I agree with Nelkin that there should be a match between the 
operative desire and the content of the self-deceptive belief, otherwise a) it is not clear that 
it is a case of SD, for the self-deceptive belief must be thematically linked with the original 
motivation; b) methodologically, the shift looks an ad hoc adjustment. Think of the example 
of Swann: his self-deceptive belief that Odette is faithful to him corresponds to his desire. 
Such correspondence allows any external observer to suspect SD, given that the resulting 
belief that P fulfills Swann’s desire and, at the same time, runs against the evidence available 
to him. Next, consider the example of Othello. Following Mele, Othello’s original desire of 
Desdemona’s fidelity is not the operative one producing the (false) adverse belief that she is 
guilty. According to Mele, here the original desire is trumped by another—the desire of not 
being fooled—which becomes operative in triggering data biasing and producing the false 
belief of Desdemona’s infidelity. Thus, the operative desire has no content-match with the 
resulting self-deceptive belief, and in Nelkin’s terms it is content-unrestricted.
Point (2) is raised by Dana Nelkin in her attempt to find an alternative solution to the content-
restrictedness issue for twisted SD. She thinks that it is possible to keep unitary the causal 
explanation in both straight and twisted case if what the subject wishes is not P, but rather to 
believe that P. Swann wishes to believe Odette faithful, in order to keep his peace of mind, while, 
3. Desires in 
Straight and 
Twisted Cases
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symmetrically, Othello wishes to believe Desdemona unfaithful, in order to avoid being fooled. 
Under this description, in both cases there is a match between the operative desire and the 
self-deceptive belief. This apparently neat solution however leaves much unanswered. Does 
the self-deceiver wish to believe that P, no matter what, or rather wish that the belief that P 
be true and consequently be believed? Why should anyone want to believe that P no matter 
what? The self-deceiver is epistemically confused, but is not incoherent or crazy. Those who 
think that the operative desire is to believe that P assume that there has been an unconscious 
trade-off between the wish that P be the case and the wish to believe P no matter what. True, 
at the end of the self-deceptive process, the subject precisely gets the belief that P devoid of its 
truth-value. But what the subject eventually gets does not make such belief the primary object 
of her desire, nor of her unconscious aim. Actually the supposed trade-off between states-of-
the world and beliefs would make the pursuit of the false belief that P a crazy intent indeed 
(Lazar 1996). Nelkin’s proposed solution for keeping unitary the explanation of straight as well 
as twisted cases must be rejected.
Coming now to point (1) concerning the composition of the motivational state, Mele holds 
that there is a difference between either straight or twisted SD (2002, 111ff). In the former, 
the driving component is desire, in the latter is emotions; other scholars supporting the 
causal account instead point to different types of emotions in either SD types (Lazar 1999). 
In general, in the causal account, the specific role of emotions and desires is not clearly set 
apart. Mele, on the one hand, attributes the difference between straight and twisted cases to 
the different causal role of desires and emotions respectively; on the other hand, illustrating 
the case of the jealous husband, he also singles out an operative desire triggering the biasing 
as well, the one criticized by Nelkin for not being content-restricted. Ultimately, it is not 
clear whether the twisted cases are caused by emotions or by the operative desire or by both, 
being the emotions the cause of the desire’s switch. The lack of a clear specification of the 
motivational state weakens the causal account of the twisted cases, and, besides, attributing 
the causal factor in one case to desires and in the other to emotions makes the account less 
unitary than claimed. 
I argue instead that the components of the motivational state are the same in both straight 
and twisted SD, and, more precisely, that the motivational state giving rise to SD processes 
of all sorts comprises the desire that P and the emotions of fear and anxiety loading the 
desire that P and making it “rebellious” (Pears 1994). How to account of such composition 
of the motivational state? Given the desire that P—often already present, albeit dormant in 
the subject—two elements contribute to engender the motivational state favorable to start a 
self-deceptive belief formation process. The first is the appraisal of the evidence threatening 
the truth of P. Before that moment, Swann or Othello did not think of their lovers’ fidelity 
or infidelity. It is only when Odette fails to meet Swann at the Verdurin’s salon one night, or 
when Iago insinuates doubts about Desdemona, that jealousy is aroused. Since the emotional 
arousal proceeds from a pre-attentive appraisal and not from a proper epistemic attendance to 
and processing of, the negative evidence, it may well be the case that such appraisal is actually 
groundless. This is important for the account of twisted SD, such as Othello-like jealousy. In 
any case, the suspicion about one’s lover’s fidelity arouses emotions of fear and anxiety in the 
subject that make the wish of her fidelity the anxious focus of the agent’s desire-set. In other 
words, the desire that P is “turned on” emotionally by the threat and the suspicion about P 
not being true. At this juncture the second element becomes paramount: the subject is placed 
in circumstances such that acting in order to produce the state of affairs where P is made true 
is perceived as beyond her or his control. This is a typical circumstance for SD to start. When 
the subject is powerless about bringing about the desired state of affairs by a plan of action, 
he lingers in his thought. The fact that the fulfilment of his desire is beyond his reach, has the 
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effect of sinking the costs of inaccuracy in acquiring and processing data relevant to the truth 
of P. A properly diagnostic attitude will not mend the fact of Odette’s infidelity for Swann. 
This point is nicely illustrated by Robert Jervis (Jervis 1976), who argues that the level of 
accuracy in gathering and processing information correlates with real-life incentives and 
prices for one’s welfare. The costs of inaccuracy are irrelevant for Swann, for no attitude, 
vigilant or otherwise, will change Odette’s conduct towards him. In similar fashion, Mele 
resorts to the notion idea of a focal error to be avoided (Friedrich 1993, Trobe and Liberman 
1996). In case, no matter what the subject believes or does, he cannot bring about what he 
most wishes, the focal error to be avoided is not a dangerous outcome, which is rational 
to expect in case of incorrect information, but rather is exposing oneself to a painful truth 
unnecessarily, for changing the state of the world is beyond one’s reach. Compared to Mele’s 
explanation, Jervis adds a further non-cognitive component to the understanding of selective 
vigilance and the lack of it, namely the level of anxiety and stress concerning evidence 
processing. Low and high level of anxiety typically induce less accuracy and vigilance 
than a medium level of stress. But while low anxiety leads the subject to rely on routine 
and traditional patterns of conduct, high anxiety and stress tend to engender “defensive 
avoidance,” that is a blocking of the negative information and reliance on a false soothing 
belief, which is precisely a form of SD. Clearly, this explanation holds only under the condition 
that the subject is an agent, though confused, and not a victim of the emotional state that 
triggers the biasing behind his back. Only an agent can sense, perceive, or suspect the need for 
vigilance. 
To sum up: Odette’s love and fidelity is beyond Swann’s control. Hence the cost for inaccuracy 
sinks, since Swann has no expectation of changing Odette’s mind through more accurate 
information. Besides, a positive correlation between high anxiety and defensive avoidance 
has also been shown: therefore, Swann not only cannot gain anything from a more accurate 
information of Odette’s bearings, but his emotional state also tends to cause a cognitive 
attitude of “defensive avoidance”, for, under his unfortunate circumstances, the focal error 
to be avoided is disbelieving Odette faithfully unnecessarily. Consequently, the threshold of 
evidence Swann requires to revise his belief about Odette’s fidelity is disproportionally high. 
It is not a coincidence that typical examples of SD have to do with questions which are at 
the same time crucial for the subject’s well-being and beyond his control: marital infidelity, fatal 
illness, and children’s problems of addiction or criminal behavior. The first circumstance of 
crucial desires heightens anxiety, while the second makes the costs of accuracy sink. 
These same two circumstances occur in twisted SD as well: a state of affairs crucial for the 
subject’s well-being is threatened by the suspicion of contrary evidence that is beyond the 
subject’s control. But the same circumstances may engender different forms of bias depending 
on different emotional and cognitive responses.
Coming back now to the motivational state, I shall propose the following unpacking:
1) The operative desire is the desire that P and not the desire to believe that P.
2) The operative desire is a top priority in S’s preference ranking.
3) The costs of inaccuracy in acquiring and processing data relevant to the knowledge that P 
is low or irrelevant for S.
4) The desire that P is emotionally loaded by fear and anxiety.
5) These two emotions are aroused by the appraisal or misappraisal of negative evidence 
threatening the truth of P. 
The three issues left unsolved in the causal account, namely specificity, selectivity, and the 
unitary explanation of both straight and twisted SD, can now find a satisfactory response. 
4. Costs of 
Inaccuracy and 
Selective Vigilance
5. Revising the 
motivational state
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Briefly, (5) and (4) within the invisible hand model explain the specificity of SD. The desire that 
P is emotionally loaded by fear and anxiety produced by the appraisal of negative evidence as 
to the truth that P. S, anxiously suspecting that P is under threat, and powerless to counter 
the threat, starts thinking over the matter, and becomes prey to cognitive biases under 
the influence of her emotionally loaded wish that P. SD is entered only under condition (3), 
concerning the sinking of accuracy costs in the circumstances, and condition (4) inducing 
defensive avoidance. Thus, (3) and (4) jointly explain the selectivity of SD, but only under 
the condition that SD is intentionally entered. If by contrast, the subject is the victim of the 
motivational state getting a causal grip on cognition, activating biases, and producing the 
motivationally false P, then he can hardly be sensitive to costs of accuracy/inaccuracy and 
threshold of vigilance. Moreover, the biases’ activation is secured by the motivational state ex 
ante, hence the costs of accuracy/inaccuracy seem redundant for starting SD. 
Let’s turn now to the unitary explanation of twisted and straight SD. The supporters of the 
deflationary account say that in either SD type, a motivational state triggers cognitive biases 
ending up in the fictional belief that P, either favorable or adverse. (Scott-Kakures 2000: 
354). In twisted cases it is emotions rather than desires that switch on the biasing, and that 
explains the different result. Mele adds to this explanation a switch in the operative desire 
that is no more the desire that P (wife faithful) but the desire that Q (not being fooled). Thus 
this unitary model implies two unjustified shifts in twisted cases compared to straight ones: 
a) the emotional component takes the lead and causes the bias ending up in the false adverse 
belief; b) there is a shift in the operative desire as well, from the desire that P to the desire that 
Q. Both shifts are unexplained, and taken together they explain too much. If there is a shift in 
the operative desire from P to Q, then there is no need to suppose that the causal job is done 
by emotions, for the desire that Q is acting precisely like the desire that P in straight cases. Yet 
the resulting adverse belief ~P is not matching the operative desire that Q, thus giving rise to 
the issue of content-unrestrictiveness. If instead, the causal job is done by emotions, there is 
no need to shift the operative desire. It is still unexplained why S (wrongly) suspecting that P 
is under threat, becomes prey to the biases unleashed by fear and produces the false adverse 
belief ~P, and S¹(rightly) suspecting that P is under threat, let the desire that P to switch on 
biases producing the false favorable belief that P. The difference cannot lie in the fact that 
suspicion is right in straight cases and wrong in twisted ones, for it being right or wrong is 
an external condition and is apparently independent from the subject’s motivational and 
epistemic setting.
As argued above, the motivational state has the same content for either case of SD. That S is 
moved by ungrounded emotions does not change how the SD process is started. In both cases, 
S is not (or believes not to be) in a position to act in order to undo the threat and bring about 
the state of affairs ex-ante. Like in most SD cases, S faces matters crucial to her well-being, 
yet beyond her control, actually lowering the costs of inaccuracy. The response is a thinking 
process affected by biases ending up in the deceptive belief. This is the common model 
operating in both cases; let us now consider the difference between straight and twisted SD. 
In straight SD, self-deceivers usually display confirmatory bias that is the mental habit to 
look for confirmation of one’s hypothesis, while epistemic rationality would recommend 
falsification as the sound procedure. Confirmatory bias leads self-deceivers to ignore or 
discount the negative evidence and to focus instead on the positive data, ending up with the 
false but favorable belief that P. In twisted cases, instead, S imagines what she most fears in 
order to face the worst possible case. In principle, such a strategy is not faulty: it is justified 
by the insurance logic that is a strongly risk-averse approach of the kind: “let’s assume the 
worst, and work out a maximin response in terms of attitudes, beliefs and actions to such a 
6. Alternative 
explanation for 
both straight and 
twisted SD
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scenario”. The problem with this strategy, however, is that worst case scenarios become easily 
affected by a special bias—probability neglect that makes the reasoning faulty. In principle, 
worst-case scenarios are improbable events, representing only one extreme of a whole range 
of possibilities, yet it seems that once the scenario has been conjured up, the low probability 
is discounted, and the subject’s fear and anxiety are reassured only by conclusive evidence 
showing the scenario false. Thus while S lowers the threshold of evidence to go on believing 
that P, S¹ heightens the threshold of evidence required to disbelieve ~P .The operative desire 
that P is matched by the resulting self-deceptive belief that ~P, though negatively, so as to be 
thematic, thus satisfying a commonly acknowledged requirement for SD. 
The general explanatory model is the same in both cases: an emotional arousal following the 
appraisal, or the misappraisal, of negative evidence makes the wish that P the anxious focus of 
the subject; the active response to bring about P is foreclosed, hence the subject starts to think 
instead. The reasoning, influenced by the wish, attempts either at confirming the belief that P 
despite contrary evidence, or at disconfirming ~P, in the absence of the relevant evidence. In 
the first case, the reasoning is affected by confirmatory bias, and in the latter by probability 
neglect. In neither case the outcome is intended though produced by intentional thinking. 
As much as the confirming strategy is the common mode of the lay hypothesis testing and 
is generally pragmatically reasonable (though epistemologically imperfect) similarly, the 
counter-factual mode of reasoning implied by the worst-case-scenario is, as said, at the basis 
of the insurance logic. In both types, normal pragmatic modes of reasoning are distorted by 
the anxious fear concerning P. As a result, in straight SD the false belief that P is confirmed, 
and in twisted SD, the opposite, but likewise false, belief ~P is produced. Admittedly, twisted 
SD does not serve the practical goal of dispelling S’s worries, but it may perversely relieve 
a certain kind of anxiety, still fulfilling a purpose for especially anxious subjects. For such 
subjects usually display a preference for certainty over uncertainty even of unwelcome truths; 
consequently, they may be miserable, but will also feel a certain relief from the anxiety of 
suspecting the worst, and a (deceptive) sense of control.
 
Twisted SD cases pose a challenge for the intentional view of SD, according to which the 
self-deceptive belief fulfills a goal of the subject. Purposefulness cannot be assumed in 
the case of twisted SD, given that the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject’s desires. It 
may actually be the case that extremely anxious subjects have a preference for unpleasant 
certainty over uncertainty. Yet, within the intentional framework it remains unclear why such 
overanxious subjects would not try to relieve their anxiety by believing something soothing, 
thus overcoming uncertainty and unwelcoming evidence at the same time. Causal accounts 
apparently present a clear advantage with reference to the issue of twisted cases. The latter 
need not be assumed as the outcome of special perversity. Twisted cases are a type of SD, 
produced in the same way as straight SD: they are the result of a motivational state causally 
switching on cognitive biases resulting in a false belief, no matter if favorable or adverse. 
The appeal of such a unitary and simple account of both types of SD is clear. However, if this 
account is duly analyzed, then it turns out to be less unitary than claimed, for the causal 
switch is not the same in either case, and moreover, the operative desire in the twisted case is 
content-unrestricted. 
My alternative invisible hand account provides a general model for either straight or twisted 
cases, which can be articulated in different reasoning strategies thus making sense of the two 
opposing outcomes as well. The invisible hand account holds that the SD process is entered 
intentionally and legitimately too: it is the response of an agent who has met with negative 
evidence concerning one of her desires, and is powerless to counter the threat. Under the 
circumstances, the agent is anxious and cannot act rationally, resolving her worries by fixing 
7. Conclusions
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the problem. The agent lingers in thinking about the problem, and thinking is something 
that she does intentionally. Yet the fact of her powerlessness, along with her anxiety, lowers 
costs of accuracy, manipulating the threshold of evidence required to either disbelieve or 
believe that P is true. The result is the relaxation of her usual epistemic standards without her 
noticing. This is the common track of SD of either type, made up of intentional steps and non-
intentional twists; what changes is the cognitive strategy. If the subject is testing the truth of 
P, and in so doing, is caught in by confirmatory bias, we have straight SD, with the deceptive 
belief matching the agent’s desire. If the subject conjures up a worst-case scenario, she falls 
victim to probability neglect, and without a final disproof she will be caught by the false and 
adverse belief that ~P. The choice of the strategy is intentional, but the related bias is not, just 
as the outcome is unintended. 
To conclude: the same invisible hand model explains the self-deceptive production of both 
favorable and adverse beliefs, without the need to shift the causal components from desires 
to emotions, and without the need to shift the operative desire. The operative desire is always 
a) emotionally overloaded; b) the same that originates the worries of the subject; c) content-
restricted in either case, though in twisted case it is in the negative form. If the product of 
twisted SD is an adverse belief, feeding worries and fears of the subject, it can still be said that 
in a special sense the belief serves a goal of the subject by dispelling her uncertainty over what 
to believe.
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